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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Criminal Law-Habeas Corpus-
The 1963 Trilogy
A merely representative list, not intended to be exhaustive, of the
allegations of denial of due process in violation of the fourteenth
amendment which the Supreme Court has deemed cognizable on
habeas would include jury prejudice,
1 use of coerced confessions, 2
the knowing introduction of perjured testimony by the prosecution,8
mob domination of the trial,4 discrimination in jury selection" and
denial of counsel.' And the currently expanding concepts of what
constitutes due process of law will in the future present an even
greater variety of situations in which habeas corpus will lie to test
the constitutionality of state criminal proceedings.1
In 1963 the Supreme Court of the United States handed down
three decisions which will greatly increase the importance of the
writ of habeas corpus as a means of protecting the constitutional
rights of those convicted of crimes. The first of these, Fay v. Noia,8
deals with the availability of federal habeas corpus relief to a person
who has been convicted of a crime in a state court. Townsend v.
Sain9 attempts to redefine the situations in which a person who has
been convicted of a crime in a state court has a right to an evidentiary
hearing in the federal courts upon submitting an application for
habeas corpus. Finally, Sanders v. United States'0 deals with the
right of a person who has been convicted of a crime in the federal
'Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
'Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
'Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
'Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
'Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
' Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
'For example, the Court has recently overruled Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942), in Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), holding that due
process demands that indigent state criminal defendants be provided with
counsel. And in an earlier case, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), it was
held that due process is violated by the use of illegally seized evidence in
state criminal prosecutions.
S372 U.S. 391 (1963).
°372 U.S. 293 (1963).
1 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
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courts to a second or successive hearing when he claims that he has
been deprived of his constitutional rights.
I. FAY v. NOiA*
Noia, Caminito and Bonino were taken into custody for ques-
tioning concerning a murder committed during an attempted rob-
bery. They were held incommunicado, questioned by officers work-
ing in relays, falsely identified by three detectives posing as wit-
nesses to the crime, and given unheated, unfurnished jail cells. Later,
when Noia and Caminito were placed in the same cell, Noia
suggested that they confess to escape further harassment, in
the belief that the confessions would later be excluded as evidence
due to coercion. The confessions were signed, and only then was
the trio taken before a magistrate for arraignment."
The trial court judge permitted the jury to pass on the question
of coercion, and the issue was decided adversely to the defendants.
Caminito and Bonino took direct appeals, but were unsuccessful in
both the Appellate Division of the 'New York Supreme Court'2 and
the New York Court of Appeals. 3 Caminito twice filed motions to
reargue in the New York Court of Appeals without success.' 4 He
applied to the United States Supreme Court for certiorari follow-
ing the second denial, which was likewise unsuccessful. 5 Bonino's
motion to reargue was also denied,' as was his application for a
writ of certiorari.
Caminito then sought habeas corpus from the federal district
court, which refused to issue the writ.'" The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, reversed, sustaining the claim that the confession
had been secured in violation of the fourteenth amendment, and
directed the State to discharge him from custody or give him a new
* This portion of the Note was contributed by Robert G. Baynes.
A complete statement of the circumstances surrounding the arrest and
interrogation of the three men may be found in United States ex rel.
Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1955).
1" State v. Bonino, 265 App. Div. 960, 38 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (1942); State v.
Caminito, 265 App. Div. 960, 38 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (1942).
13 State v. Bonino, 291 N.Y. 541, 50 N.E.2d 654 (1943).
" State v. Caminito, 297 N.Y. 882, 79 N.E.2d 277 (1948); State v.
Caminito, 307 N.Y. 686, 120 N.E.2d 857 (1954).
1" Caminito v. New York, 348 U.S. 839 (1954).
1" State v. Bonino, 296 N.Y. 1004, 73 N.E.2d 579 (1947).
" Bonino v. New York, 333 U.S. 849 (1948).
" United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 127 F. Supp. 689 (N.D.N.Y.
1955).
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trial."9 After Caminito's release, Bonino moved to reargue his
appeal in the New York Court of Appeals, and his conviction was also
set aside and a new trial ordered on the ground that it was unconsti-
tutionally procured.20 In all probability, neither Caminito nor
Bonino will ever be retried since the State presented no evidence
other than the confessions, and there is little possibility of obtaining
new evidence concerning a crime committed in 1942.
Following the release of his co-defendants, Noia, who had not
appealed his original conviction, made an application to the sen-
tencing court in the nature of coram nobis,21 and his conviction was
set aside ;22 however, the Appellate Division reversed" and the New
York Court of Appeals affirmed.24 A writ of certiorari was denied."
Noia's next step was to apply to the federal district court for a
writ of habeas corpus.26 Relief was denied on the ground that he had
failed to comply with 28 U.S.C. section 225427 requiring exhaustion
of state remedies as a condition precedent to the granting of habeas
corpus by the federal courts to a state prisoner. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit reversed," questioning whether the
statute barred habeas corpus relief when the petitioner had failed to
" United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 896 (1955).
" State v. Bonino, 1 N.Y.2d 752, 152 N.Y.S.2d 298, 135 N.E.2d 51
(1956).
"A writ of error coram nobis is a remedy to bring a case before the
sentencing court for review or modification due to some error of law or fact
affecting the validity of the proceedings which was not brought into issue
at the trial. It challenges the validity of petitioner's conviction for matters
extraneous to the record. In re Taylor, 230 N.C. 566, 53 S.E.2d 857 (1949);
see generally, 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1606 (1961).
"2 State v. Noia, 3 Misc. 2d 447, 158 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1956).
" State v. Noia, 4 App. Div. 2d 698, 163 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1957).
"' State v. Caminito, 3 N.Y.2d 596, 170 N.Y.S.2d 799, 148 N.E.2d 139
(1958).
' Noia v. New York, 357 U.S. 909 (1958)." United States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, 183 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
2728 U.S.C. § 2254 (1948). This statute provides: "An application for a
writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judg-
ment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the appli-
cant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that
there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the ex-
istence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the prisoner. An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted
the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this
section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any avail-
able procedure, the question presented."" United States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, 300 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1962).
[Vol. 42_354
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exhaust state remedies no longer available to him at the time of his
petition, and holding the statute inapplicable due to exceptional cir-
cumstances.29 The court of appeals also rejected the contention that
New York's refusal to grant coram nobis after the time for appeal
had lapsed was an adequate and independent ground of decision due
again to the exceptional circumstances. Finally, that court held that
no waiver of the constitutional claim could be inferred from Noia's
failure to appeal.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari8" and held:.
(1) Federal courts have power under the federal habeas
corpus statute to grant relief despite the applicant's failure to
have pursued a state remedy not available to him at the time he
applies; the doctrine under which state procedural defaults are
held to constitute an adequate and independent state law ground
barring direct Supreme Court review is not to be extended to
limit the power granted the federal courts under the f~deral
habeas statute. (2) Noia's failure to appeal was nota failure to
exhaust "the remedies available in the courts of the State" as_,
required by § 2254; that requirement refers only to a failure to
exhaust state remedies still open to the applicant, at the time he
files his application to habeas corpus in the federal coutf. (3)
Noia's failure to appeal cannot under the circumstances be 'deemed
an intelligent and understanding waiver of his right to" ap-
peal ....
These three doctrinal hurdles to federal jurisdiction-the 'riile
requiring exhaustion of state remedies, the doctrine of waivr and the
doctrine of independent and adequate state grounds ,for decisin--
will be treated separately.
A. The Exhaustion Requirement
The statute32 requiring the exhaustion of state remedies as a
condition precedent to an application for federal habeas corpus relief
20 The exceptional circumstances were "the undisputed violation of a sig-
nificant constitutional right, the knowledge of this violation brought home
to the federal court at the incipiency of the habeas corpus proceeding so
forcibly that the state made no effort to contradict it, and the freedom the
relator's codefendants now have by virtue of their vindications of the identical
constitutional right ... " United States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, 300 F.2d 345,
362 (2d Cir. 1962).:o Fay v. Noia, 369 U.S. 869 (1962).
'Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1963).
8" See note 27 supra.
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on behalf of a state prisoner is a codification of earlier case law. 8
Those decisions establish that the rule is not inflexible 4 and is one
which should yield always to exceptional circumstances. 5 In addi-
tion, the statute explicitly excuses a failure to exhaust when "there
is either an absence of available State corrective process or the ex-
istence of circumstances rendering the process ineffective to protect
the rights of the prisoner."3
The exhaustion requirement is based on two policy considera-
tions: first, it is dictated by the exigencies of federalism (the doc-
trine whereby the federal courts defer action on state cases until the
state courts have acted) ;3T second, it is necessary to prevent an in-
flux of habeas petitions into the federal courts.38
Necessarily, the exhaustion requirement presupposes the ex-
istence of some adequate state post-conviction remedy to test the
constitutionality of the conviction, 9 whether it be by way of appeal,
habeas corpus, or a writ of error corarn nobis. If such a remedy is
unavailable, the federal district court may entertain an application
for a writ of habeas corpus without further proceedings. 40 There
is also federal jurisdiction when the remedy, otherwise valid, is
shown to be unavailable or seriously inadequate in a particular
case. 4" Finally, the rule requiring the exhaustion of state remedies
is not enforced when post-conviction remedies are discriminatorily
denied the applicant in violation of the equal protection clause.4
A problem which arises immediately in the construction of this
statute42 is whether the exhaustion requirement applies only to
those remedies still available to petitioner at the time of his appli-
cation for habeas, or whether the remedies must have been exhausted
during the time when they were available according to state pro-
cedure. In other words, is there a doctrine of forfeiture built into
the exhaustion rule?
'Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
'Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
'5 Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
,28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1948).
"Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
3" Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
"Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951).,Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
"A Ibid.
'1 Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951)."2 See note 27 supra.
[Vol. 42
NOTES AND COMMENTS
With a reminder that the-statute, was a codification of then ex-
isting case law,48 the Court in-Fay addressed itself to the precedents
bearing on this ppint. In Ex parte Spencer," the Court gave a clear
indication that federal relief would not be available to an applicant
who had failed to exhaust the state remedies while they were still
available. The same position was taken in Frank v. Mangum," but
this case may have been over-ruled by- Moore v. Dempsey.48 And
in Mooney v. Holoban47 the Court phrased the exhaustion require-
ment in terms of the remedies which "may still remain open."" The
majority in Fay, refusing to construe. the statute as indicating a
congressional intent to change the law in this regard, squarely held
that the requirement is limited in application to "failure to exhaust
state remedies still open to the applicant at the time he files his ap-
plication in federal court." 49
What of the situation where in a given state there is more than
one procedural device by which the defendant can vindicate the
claimed violation of his constitutional rights? Must he avail himself
of all remedies before he will be deemed to have complied with the
statutory admonition to exhaust state remedies, or is it sufficient
that one alternative has been pursued to a conclusion?
In Ex parte Hawk,5" it-was suggested that federal habeas corpus
would be available to a state prisoner only after all state remedies
had been exhausted on the theory that so long as there remained an
untried remedy,, there had.been no denial of..due process, and there-
fore there was no justification for permitting the conviction to be
collaterally attacked. This approach was given further impetus in a
later case" which, though not presenting a square holding on the
point, indicated that the rule should be strictly construed as requir-
ing exhaustion of every alternative.: But the Court changed its di-
rection completely in Wade v. Mayo52 by holding that to exhaust any
single alternative remedy constituted compliance with the require-
"Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, (1944).
"228 U.S. 652 (1913).
" 237 U.S. 309 (1915)..
"-261 U.S. 86 (1923).
"294 U.S. 103 (1935).
" Id. at 115 (dictum).
"372 U.S. at 435 (1963)'.
°321 U.S. 114 (1944).
'1 Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947).
"Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ment. And, the question was finally laid to rest when Brown v.
Allen 8 reaffirmed Wade on this point.
Another aspect of the exhaustion requirement which has had
an inconstant career before the Supreme Court is the rule that, upon
exhaustion of state remedies, the petitioner must apply unsuccess-
fully to the Supreme Court for certiorari before applying to the
federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus, in spite of the fact
that the statute speaks only of exhausting remedies still available in
the state. This rule was announced in Ex parte Hawk 4 and was
prompted by a desire to preserve the delicate balance of federal-
-State relations.55 Later, there was an indication that application for
.certiorari would no longer be required, but this liberal trend was
short-lived. In Darr v. Burford,57 the Court restated its holding in
Hawk.
This additional prerequisite to federal habeas corpus for state
,prisoners was not really at issue in Fay v. Noia since Noia had pe-
titioned for certiorari following denial'of coram nobis relief.5 Nev-
.ertheless, the Court expressly disapproved of this requirement on the
ground that it had served in practice only to impede prompt judicial
administration."9 And though a dictum, the Court's statement
,makes it clear that a petition for certiorari following an adverse de-
.cision of the highest state tribunal will no longer be required as a
condition precedent to federal habeas corpus.
B. Adequate Non-Federal Ground
It has long been held that the Supreme Court will decline to
review those judgments of state courts which rest on adequate and
independent state grounds, even though federal questions are pres-
ent in the case.?' A state ground may be deemed independent
" 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
'321 U.S. 114 (1944).
5" The Fay case does no great violence to federal-state relations. The state
courts will continue to have the first opportunity to rule on alleged violations
of the prisoner's federal constitutional rights. And certiorari will be avail-
able to the state to have decisions of federal district courts granting habeas
corpus to state prisoners reviewed. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 438.
5 Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
United States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, 183 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
' 372 U.S. at 435.
See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958);




whether it is based on substantive6 ' or procedural" law. To be
deemed adequate, a state procedural rule may not on its face hinder
the exercise of federal rights 3 or be applied in an unduly burdensome
manner.6 4
Noia had failed to perfect an appeal within the time specified
by New York procedure. For this reason, he was denied a writ of
error corarn nobis.65 Non-compliance with state procedural rules
has been held to be an adequate state ground of decision.6 6 It could
be logically asserted, therefore, that there was an adequate and in-
dependent state ground for the denial of coram nobis sufficient to
preclude direct review by the Supreme Court on certiorari. The
Court expressed no opinion on this point, but held, instead, that this
doctrine which limits the Court's appellate jurisdiction was not to be
applied to restrict the federal district court's jurisdiction in an orig-
inal proceeding (habeas corpus). Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by
Justices Clark and Stewart, dissenting, termed this result "wholly
unprecedented." 67 They were greatly disturbed by the fact that a
petitioner, under the rule announced, whose application for certiorari
to review the state court judgment might be denied due to a pro-
cedural default constituting an adequate state ground of decision,
may nevertheless proceed immediately to petition the district court
for habeas corpus. This is, in the words of Mr. Justice Harlan, "to
turn habeas corpus into a roving commission of inquiry into every
possible invasion of the applicant's civil rights that may ever have
occurred .... ,"6s This criticism has obvious appeal to those who
feel that the power of the federal judiciary has been extended to the
point where it infringes upon that of the state. But it is deprived of
its validity by the majority's holding which gives discretion to the
1 urdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874). The question
was whether or not a trust was established for the benefit of plaintiffs.
" Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). This case involved jurisdiction
of the court and the statute of limitations.
3 Central Union Telephone Co. v. City of Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190,
194 (1925) (clear dictum).
" Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958).. A statute prohibited
solicitation without a permit from the mayor and the city council.
oNoia v. New York, 357 U.S. 905 (1958).
" Daniels v. Allen, reported sub. iwm. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953).
87372 U.S. at 463.
81 Id. at 469.
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district judge to deny relief to an applicant who deliberately bypasses
the state appellate procedure. 9
C. Waiver
The Supreme Court declines to reverse the judgments of lower
courts if it finds that the federal claim has, at some stage of the
proceedings,' been waived.7" And failure to comply with state pro-
cedural requirements has been held a waiver, assuming the absence
of circumstances excusing noncompliance such as official restraint of
the petitioner in the exercise of his rights. 71 What has become the
classic definition of waiver was enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst1
as"an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege. ' 72 The Court in Fay purported" to apply this standard
but held that Noia's failure to appeal could not, under the circum-
stances, be deemed a waiver of the alleged violation of his constitu-
tional rights. It was said that if the-habeas applicant has deliberately
bypassed the state appellate procedure, for strategic, tactical or
other reasons, the federal district court has discretion to deny him
relief. The standard to be applied in all cases is predicated on the
considered choice of the petitioner..
Had Noia appealed his conviction, reversal would have meant
a new trial at which he could have been sentenced to death. Clearly,
his decision not to take such an unappealing alternative, but to serve
his sentence of life imprisonment, was not merely a strategic or
tactical choice. Just as clearly, however, it was "an intentional re-
linquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege"73 and
while the Court cautions against the assumption that waiver will
not be found merely because there is a very real risk of a heavier
penalty being imposed,74 it relies on the fact that Noia's risk of in-
curring the death penalty was "palpable and indeed acute.17
"372 U.S. at 438.
oJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
'Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951).
- 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
7Id at 464.
73 Ibid.
7"372 U.S. at 440.
"Indeed, Noia had barely escaped the death penalty at his trial. The
sentencing judge, not bound by the jury's recommendation of a life sen-
tence, informed Noia that he accepted the jury's recommendation only be-
cause of the persuasiveness of defense counsel: "You have got a good law-
yer, that is my wife. The last thing she told me this morning is to give
you a chance." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 396 n.3.
[Vol. 42
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I. TOWNSEND V. SAIN*
Another case76 concerning the duties of federal district courts
when habeas corpus is sought on the grounds that a state court con-
viction has denied petitioner his constitutional rights was decided
with Fay v. Noia" Petitioner's conviction of murder in the courts-
of Illinois was largely the result of the admission into evidence of a
confession which was claimed to be involuntary." The trial -judge
held an evidentiary hearing to determine this question at which con-
flicting testimony was introduced, but he made no findings of fact
and did not write an opinion stating the grounds for his decision.
Petitioner appealed the conviction unsuccessfully79 and also sought
post conviction relief in the Illinois courts,79a continuously asserting
the involuntariness of his confession. He then sought habeas corpus
in the federal district court, but his petition was denied without a
hearing."0 The Supreme Court reversed, 8' but on remand the court
of appeals again denied a hearing, holding that on habeas corpus the
inquiry of the district judge is limited to the undisputed portion of
the record.8' The Supreme Court again granted certiorari, 8  and
Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a majority of five, again re-
versed.84
In Brown v. Allens5 the Supreme Court laid down the following
rule to guide the federal district courts in determining when an evi-
dentiary hearing is mandatory :86
When the record of the state court proceeding is before the court, it
may appear that the issue turns on basic facts and that the facts
* This portion of the Note was contributed by DeWitt C. McCotter.
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
372 U.S. 391 (1963). See Part I supra.
The opinion of the Supreme Court has been relied upon for a state-
ment of these facts. See 372 U.S. at 296.
People v. Townsend, 11 Il.-2d 30, rert. denied, 355 U.S. 850 (1957).
"' This attempt is apparently unreported.
United States ex rel. Townsend v. Sain, 265 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1958).
8'Townsend v. Sain, 359 U.S..64"(1959). - -
:' United States e, rel. Townsend v. Sain, 276 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1960).'Townsend.v. Sain, 365 U.S. 886 (1961").. .
"Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
85344 U.S. 443 (1953).
Congress has given federal courts power to "summarily hear and de-
termine the facts as law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1958). The
Supreme Court has interpreted -this power to be largely within the discretion
of the district court judges. Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390 (1958); Brown
v. Allen, supra note 85.
19641.
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have been tried and adjudged against the applicant. Unless a
vital flaw be found in the process of ascertaining such facts in the
state court, the district judge may accept the determination in the
state proceeding and deny the application.
87
More recently, the Court made the following statement about the
applicability of that rule:
While the district judge may, unless he finds a vital flaw in the
state court proceedings, accept the determination in such proceed-
ings, he need not deem such determinations binding, and may
take testimony.88
In light of this language, it is easy to see that the test formulated
in Brown was not concerned with whether the petitioner's claim of
error was based on the undisputed portion of the record, and the
Court in the instant case could have reversed on that reason alone.
Further, testimony had been admitted at the petitioner's trial on
behalf of the State which was directly contradictory to that which
the State had presented at the evidentiary hearing; the issue had been
whether petitioner was under the influence of a "truth serum" when
he made the confession, and the doctor who administered the drug,
when testifying as a State's witness, had not disclosed that the drug
given to petitioner shortly before he confessed was commonly
thought of as a "truth serum." On these facts it hardly seems likely
that the Court was compelled to formulate new rules in order to
justify a compulsory hearing.
The Court stated, though, that the test laid down in Brown for
determining when a federal district judge must hold an evidentiary
hearing was inadequate, 9 and formulated the following test to re-
place it:
Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court on habeas corpus
must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did not
receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court, either
at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding. In other
'words a federal evidentiary hearing is required unless the state
8344 U.S. at 507 (1953).
88 Rogers v. Richmond, 357 U.S. 220 (1958) (per curiam).
8" "But experience proves that a too general standard-the 'exceptional
circumstances' and the 'vital flaw' tests of the opinions in Brown v. Allen-
does not serve adequately to explain the controlling criteria for the guidance




court trier of fact has after a full hearing reliably found the
facts.
0
Then the Court set out six specific situations in which an evidentiary
hearing would be mandatory under this test.
First, the district judge must hold a hearing if "the merits of the
factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing."'" If a full
and fair hearing has been made and the state trier of fact has made
an express adverse determination of the facts, there is no obligation
on the part of the district judge to hold an evidentiary hearing..
Further, even if there has been no express finding.of fact the district
judge does not have to hold an evidentiary hearing if he can as-
certain that the facts have been impliedly resolved against the appli-
cant for habeas. But, if no express finding of fact was made and if it,
is unclear whether the correct constitutional standards have been
applied either because the applicant is able to introduce some evidence
creating this doubt or because the issue of law raised by any pos-
sible interpretation of the facts presents a difficult or novel consti-
tutional question, the district judge must hold an evidentiary hear-
ing.
Second, the district judge must hold a hearing if "the state fac-
tual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole." 92
The Court makes it clear that this situation presents nothing which
has not been consistently followed in the past.93
Third, the district judge must hold a hearing if "the fact finding
procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford
a full and fair hearing."9 Thus, the obligation of the federal district
judge does not terminate with a finding that all of the relevant facts
have been presented at the state court hearing. If the state pro-
cedure is inadequate for ascertaining the truth, then the federal dis-
trict judge must disregard the state findings and hold an evidentiary
hearing.
Fourth, the federal district judge must hold an evidentiary hear-
ing "where newly discovered evidence is alleged in a habeas appli-
cation, evidence which could not reasonably have been presented
90 Id. at 312.
"I Id. at 313.
02 Ibid.
" Id. at 316. See Blackman v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) ; Fiske v.
Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
9" 372 U.S. at 313.
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to the state trier of'facts."' 95 This evidence must relate to the con-
stitutionality of the detention of the prisoner, as newly discovered
evidence relevant to the guilt of the applicant is not a grounds for
habeas relief.
Fifth, there must be a hearing if "the material facts were not ade-
quately developed at the state court hearing." 9 This requires a
hearing if for some reason not attributable to the inexcusable neg-
lect of petitioner, evidence necessary to an adequate consideration of
the constitutional claim of the petitioner was not developed at the
state court hearing.
Finally, a hearing is required in the federal courts if "for any
reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas
applicant a full and fair fact hearing. ' 97 This category was inten-
tionally left open because the Court thought it impossible to antici-
pate all of the situations in which a hearing was required,",
As the dissenting opinion pointed out,99 the Court here attempted
to catalogue a set of standards in advancei and this in itself is of
doubtful wisdom. The policy of rendering advisory opinions has
long been held to be objectionable on grounds that the Court may not
give full consideration to issues not -presented by the facts of the
particular case before it.100
Furthermore, there are objections to the standards themselves.
For example, the third criterion laid down by the Court requires a
hearing if the state fact finding procedure is not adequate for as-
certaining the truth. The Court gives the "burden of proof" as an
example of something which would make the state procedure inade-




98 Id. at 317.
" Id. at 327.
10 "It is a maxim, not to. be disregarded, that general expressions, in
every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those
expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected,
but ought not to control'the judgment in a subsequent suit, .3vhen the very
point is presented for decision. The reason-of-this maxim is obvious. The
question actually presented before the court is investigated with care, and
considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate
it are considered in relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on
all other cases is seldom completely investigated." Cohens v. 'Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821).101 372 U.S. at 316.
[Vol. 42
NOTES AND COMMENTS
guage used in the formulation of this criterion, for the term "burden
of proof" is itself subject to more than one meaning.' Other than
the burden of proof, there is no hint as to what will make a state
court proceeding inadequate for ascertaining the truth, and it is hard
to believe that the Court really meant to leave it up to the individual
judge's development of the conception of inadequacy, when the very
purpose of the criterion is uniformity. The requirement seems to
suffer the same fallacy found by the Court to be inherent in the
Brozem test,10 3 this being that the language of the Court lends itself
to varied and confused interpretations.
The fourth and fifth criteria should be read together. The fourth
deals with newly discovered evidence, and the fifth covers relevant
evidence which was not presented to the state court in a manner that
would normally reveal its significance. Both of these reflect the prin-
ciple that protection of the rights of the applicant for habeas corpus
is the court's concern even above rules designed to facilitate finality
of litigation. Thus, the Illinois court in the principal case had not
given the petitioner a "full and fair"'1 4 hearing because it had not
considered the effect of the drugs administered to him in the light
of the material fact that the drug which had been used was com-
monly thought of as a truth serum. , Rules as to newly discovered
evidence are found in many states'0 5 with a difference in emphasis.
As the Court views it, an evidentiary hearing should be held under
the enumerated circumstances unless the federal district court judge
finds that the failure to introduce or develop such evidence was due
to the fault of the petitioner, whereas states have generally imposed
procedural requirements having nothing to do with the fault of the
convicted person.Y06
... Strohfeld v. Cox, 325 Mo. 901, 30 S.W.2d 462 (1930). "The term
'burden of proof' has two distinct meanings. By the one is meant the duty of
establishing the truth of a given proposition or issue by such a quantum of
evidence as the law demands in the case in which the issue arises; by the
other is meant the duty of producing evidence at the beginning or at any
subsequent stage of the trial, in order to make out a prima facie case." Id.
at 907, 30 S.W.2d at 465.
"0' See text accompanying note 87 supra.
"' This criterion seems to be in step with the intent of the general test
to provide a full and fair hearing, as a full and fair hearing contemplates con-
sideration of all relevant evidence, whether it was brought to the attention
of the state trier of fact or not. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
"'E.g., R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 23, §9-23-2 (1956); 12 VT. STAT.
§ 2356 (1958)."'For example, 12 VT. STAT. § 2356 (1958) provides, in part: "[I]f the
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When evaluating the test laid down in Townsend, one is apt to
confuse two different questions. The first of these is whether the
protection of the constitutional rights of an accused is important
enough to justify both extensive examination of state practices and
the confusion which must result when the same question is open
to reexamination by so many different courts and procedures. As
to this question, it clearly seems that Townsend answers in the
affirmative, with only the following language of the Court possibly
serving as a qualification:
We are aware that the too-promiscuous grant of evidentiary hear-
ings could both swamp the dockets of the district courts and cause
acute and unnecessary friction with state organs of criminal
justice, while the too-limited use of such hearings would allow
many grave constitutional errors to go forever unprotected. The
accommodation of these competing factors must be made on the
front line, by the district judges who are conscious of their para-
mount responsibility in this area. 107
The second question is whether or not the guidelines formulated
by the Court will be sufficient to enable the federal district courts
to protect an accused's constitutional rights. General objections to
such tests because they resemble advisory opinions have already
been discussed ;108 however, it must be remembered that the Supreme
Court undertakes to exercise a supervisory power over lower federal
courts, 10 9 and, for this reason, attempts to lay down standards may
be desirable if the standards are clear and understandable. Further-
more, their existence tends to solve the problem created when lower
federal courts are given broad discretionary powers to examine the
practices of state appellate courts, 110 because the district judges can
say with justification that they are acting under a mandate from the
United States Supreme Court, which clearly has the right to review
reasons assigned are the discovery of new evidence or other matter of fact,
such citation shall-be served within two years after rendition of the original
judgment."
107 372 U.S. at 319.
108 See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
10' "Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the
federal courts implies the duty of maintaining and establishing civilized
standards of procedure and evidence. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 340 (1942).
10 See Bartor, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HIv. L. Rnv. 441 (1962).
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state appellate courts in matters involving the Constitution of the
United States. 1 '
Another consideration which must have influenced the Court.
in laying down a new test was that the one formulated in Brown v.
Allen had wrought confusing and conflicting views in the several
circuits. For example, one view was that a hearing was required if
the well pleaded facts were sufficient to establish a prima facie case
of merit.' 2 Another view had it that the trial court's determination
of the disputed facts was binding on the district judge."' Conse-
quently, the situation demanded clarification, and the Court may
well have thought that the validity of a person's imprisonment was
too important a consideration to wait on a case by case examina-;
tion of each view.
However, whether the guidelines formulated in Townsend will
provide a workable standard is an unanswerable question at the
present time. The Court expressly left room to expand the situa-
tions in which an evidentiary hearing will be required,"14 and it.
seems to have been deliberately general in laying out those situations.
which it did discuss. In fact, it is probable that the Court thinks that
district court judges have been too slow in granting evidentiary
hearings and wrote its opinion more to change their basic approach
than to revolutionize the grounds for granting evidentiary hearings.
Thus, the desirability of what the Court did will be an open question
to those who are not opposed to the Court's concept of habeas corpus
altogether, and they will have to reserve judgment pending applica-
tion of the criteria by the lower federal courts. At the present time,
however, it is clear that federal district court judges have been told
that protecting the constitutional rights of habeas corpus applicants
is more important than considerations of the possible impact of
their decisions on federal-state relations and of reducing a crowded
federal docket. Therefore, habeas corpus is bound to be an increas-
ingly important part of the process by which a criminal suspect's
constitutional rights are protected.
" See 28 U.S.C § 1257 (1958).
. Wiggins v. Ragen, 238 F.2d 309 (7th Cir. 1956).
... This was view taken by the court of appeals in the principle case. See
note 82 supra and accompanying text. See generally Comment, Federal
Habeas Corpus Review of State Convictions: An Interplay of Appellate and
District Court Discretion, 68 YALE L.J. 98 (1958).
" See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
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III. SANDERS V. UNITED STATES*
In Sanders v. United States"5 the Supreme Court broadened
post-conviction collateral relief from criminal convictions in the fed-
eral courts: Sanders -was convicted of robbing a federally-insured
bank and received a fifteen year sentence. Thereafter he filed a mo-
tion to vacate the conviction under 28 U.S.C. section 2255,1 6
which was denied without a hearing on the ground that it alleged
only bare conclusions. The court went on to say, however, that the
records of the trial conclusively showed the petitioner's claims to be
without merit. Subsequently, Sanders filed a second motion to va-
cate, alleging'that he was a known narcotics addict; that medical
authorities administered narcotics to him from time to time while
he was being detained, including the period during which he had
appeared in court; and that as a result of the administration of nar-
cotics, he had been mentally incompetent when he had pleaded guilty
and had been sentenced. The district court again denied petitioner's
motion without a hearing, basing its denial on his failure to indi-
cate why the allegation of mental incompetency had not been pre-
sented on the first motion and stating that his claims were without
merit. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision," 7 approving the grounds on which the hear-
ing was denied and stressing the fact that petitioner had knowledge
of the facts alleged on the second motion at the time he had filed his
first motion." s The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari," 9 reversed both lower courts, and held that the district
court should have held a hearing on the merits of the second
motion.
20
* This portion of the Note was contributed by Richard Dailey.
115373 U.S. 1 (1963).
110 "Under that statute, a federal prisoner who claims that his sentence
was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States
may seek relief from the sentence by filing a motion in the sentencing court
stating the facts supporting his claim. '[A] prompt hearing' on the motion is
required 'unless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief .... ' The section further pro-
vides that 'the-sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second
or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.'
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1963).
"" Sanders v. United States, 297 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1961).
... This statement of facts is taken from Sanders v. United States, 297
F.2d 735, 736 (9th Cir. 1961).
119370 U.S. 936 (1962).
0 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
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In reaching its decision the Court was faced with the problem
of interpreting the provision in section 2255 which provides that
the "sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or
successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner."'21
At the time of this appeal this provision had received con-
flicting interpretations in the various circuits. Some courts had been
liberal in requiring a hearing on the second motion, holding that
such a motion alleging new grounds requires a hearing unless, the
record conclusively shows that the movant is entitled to no relief ;122
that it need only allege facts sufficient to entitle the petitioner to
relief and need not allege non-abuse of the process ;12 and that a
hearing is required when the government neither denies the new
allegations nor pleads abuse of the process.124 Others had been very
strict, holding that even when new grounds are alleged, the court
may exercise its discretion and deny a hearing on the motion. 25
In the instant case it appears that the district court would" have
required without qualification that the second motion justify the
omission from the-first motion of the new grounds, while the court
of appeals would have required such justification if it appeared that
the petitioner had withheld grounds on the first motion and sought
to avail.himself of those grounds on a later motion.
To resolve this conflict, the Supreme Court turned to the his-
tories of sections 2244 and 2255 of the Judicial Code. Section
2244,126 enacted in 1948, is a codification of the following principle
laid down in Salinger vs. Loisel:1
7
12128 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).122 Juelich v. United States, 300 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1962).
' Smith v. United States, 270 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1959). This position
recognizes that the applications are frequently drafted by the petitioner with-
out aid of counsel, and in such a case the petitioner should not be held to the
niceties of pleading an elaborate negative.
'"' Dunn v. United States, 234 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1956)..
.2 Lipscomb v. United States, 226 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1955) ; Johnson v.
United States, 213 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1954).
12028 U.S.C. § 2244 (1958) provides that "No circuit or district judge
shall be required to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus to
inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to a judgment of a court of
the United States, or of any State, if it appears that the legality of such
detention has been determined by a judge or court of the United States on a
prior application for a. writ of habeas corpus and the petition presents no
new ground not theretofore presented and determined, and the judge or
court is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be served by such in-
quiry."
'"2265 U.S. 224 (1924).
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[EJach application is to be disposed of in the exercise of a sound
judicial discretion guided and controlled by a consideration of
whatever has a rational bearing on the propriety of the discharge
sought. Among the matters which may be considered, and even
given controlling weight, are ... a prior refusal to discharge on
a like application.
128
In Sanders the Court interpreted this language to mean that
under section 2244 a district court may deny the second motion
without a hearing only when it seeks to retry a claim fully decided
in a prior motion.
Section 2255 was enacted in 1948 to provide "an expeditious
remedy for correcting erroneous sentences without resort to habeas
corpus,"' 29 and to afford the prisoner "the same rights in another
and more convenient forum."' 3 0 Hence the similar relief provision
of section 2255 should be interpreted as the equivalent of section
2244.
Thus the Court has completely removed res judicata as an im-
portant consideration in post-conviction collateral relief. This was
done because "conventional notions of finality of litigation have no
place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitu-
tional rights is alleged."''1
In Sanders, as in Fay v. Noia' 2 and Townsend v. Sain,183 the
Supreme Court formulated some basic rules to guide the lower
federal courts. The rules announced in the Sanders case are in-
tended to aid the lower courts in handling successive applications for
federal habeas corpus and motions under section 2255. When a sub-
sequent motion relies on a ground presented in the prior motion, the
subsequent motion is properly denied without a hearing only if (1)
the same ground was determined adversely to the applicant on the
prior motion;184 (2) the prior determination was on the merits;""8
128 Id. at 231.
2228 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958), Reviser's Note.
.3 United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952).
... Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963).
' 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See Part I supra.
...372 U.S. 293 (1963). See Part II supra.
...The Court defined "ground" as a sufficient legal basis for granting
relief. It is necessary to distinguish between a new ground and a same ground
couched in different language or supported by different legal arguments and
factual allegations. Should there be any doubt as to whether two grounds
are different or are the same, the court should resolve the doubt in favor of
the petitioner. 373 U.S. at 16."'3 "[I]f factual issues were raised in the prior application, and it was not
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and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by a hearing on the
merits of the subsequent motion.18 6 In a case where a subsequent
application presents either a new ground or a ground previously al-
leged but not adjudged on the merits, a hearing on the merits of
the subsequent application must be held unless there has been an abuse
of process on the part of the petitioner and the Government has the
burden of pleading such abuse."'r Thus it is clear that there are two
principles upon which a subsequent motion may be denied without
a hearing: a prior adverse determination of the grounds on the
merits and abuse of process. The Court addressed these principles
to the sound discretion of the federal trial judges. "Theirs is the
major responsibility for the just and sound administration of the
federal collateral remedies, and theirs must be the judgment as to
whether a second or successive application shall be denied without
consideration of the merits."'
s
These three cases reflect the Court's concern with making avail-
able to prisoners an effective device to safeguard their constitutional
rights. Quoting in part from Fay, the Court in Sanders said: "If
'government... [is] always [to] be accountable to the judiciary for
a man's imprisonment' . . . access to the courts on habeas must not
-be thus impeded." 9
The Supreme Court, in these decisions, seems to be eliminating
the authority of a lower federal court to deny a hearing on a motion
for collateral relief on procedural defects alone. It appears now that
denied on the basis that the files and records conclusively resolved these is-
sues, an evidentiary hearing was held." 373 U.S. at 16.
... Even when a prior motion has been denied on the merits, the court
may, in its discretion, consider a subsequent motion. The petitioner may, for
example, show that there has been an intervening change in the law; or he
may show that he did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing on tle
prior motion. (The criteria of a full and fair evidentiary hearing are dis-
cussed in Townsend v. Sain). The burden is on the petitioner to show that
the ends of justice would be served by a redetermination of a ground pre-
viously adjudged adversely to him. 373 U.S. at 16-17.
18 The Court does not allocate the burden of proof; however, in Price
v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948), the Court placed the burden on the pe-
titioner to prove non-abuse of the writ of habeas corpus. This is a justi-
fiable allocation of the burden; the relevant facts would nearly always be
within the exclusive possession of the petitioner. Furthermore, a prisoner
who wishes to reopen his case and challenge the finality of the litigation
should be required to show that he is acting in good faith and not out of a
desire to harass the courts.118 373 U.S. at 18.
188 373 U.S. at 8.
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the court must hear any motion for relief unless the record con-
clusively shows the movant is not entitled to a hearing or unless it is
evident that the movant has abused the process. Determining
whether or not an applicant has a just complaint is thus more im-
portant than requiring him to conform to the niceties of judicial
procedure.
IV. CONCLUSION
Though the general and sweeping language of the Court in these
three decisions makes it difficult to formulate concrete predictions
about the outcome of future cases, it seems fairly certain, barring ac-
tion by Congress or a change in the personnel of the Court, that
habeas corpus will be an important instrument in determining the
scope of the ever-increasing constitutional protection afforded those
accused of crime. The remaining obstacle which the court faces,
however, is formidable. From 1946 to 1957 only 1.4 per cent of the
applicants for habeas corpus were successful.14 This may be be-
cause most of the applications were "frivolous," '41 or it may be be-
cause federal district judges have neither been disposed nor equipped
to determine whether habeas corpus should have been granted. Yet
the number of such applications has been steadily increasing,1 42 and
these decisions, when coupled with those in Gideon v. Wainright48
and Mapp v. Ohio,144 are bound to cause an even greater augmen-
tation.
In the light of problems of time and personnel which are certain
to plague the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court has only three
alternatives. It can continue to reverse the decisions of the lower
federal courts and thus complicate the problems even more; it can
devise either some methods to aid, these courts in determining
whether there is merit in an application, rather than just the possi-
bility of merit, or some rules facilitating finality of litigation; or it
can retreat from the position it has taken in these three cases. Of
these only the second is desirable. The constitutional rights of the
criminally accused are indeed important, but unless there is a way
1,0 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 445 n.1 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
• This is Mr. Justice Clark's reason. Id. at 445.
1,2 Id. at 446 n.2.
x, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
14367 U.S. 643 (1961).
[Vol. 42
NOTES AND COMMENTS
to make hearing their applications physically possible, these consti-





Federal Income Taxation-The Unhappy Circumstance of
Liquidation And Reincorporation
Two recent decisions of the Tax Court, David T. Grubbs' and
Joseph C. Gallagher,2 illustrate the problems which confront the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue when he attempts to tax distri-
butions of accumulated earnings and profits3 at ordinary income tax
rates when such distributions occur in a transaction of preincorpora-
tion-liquidation or liquidation-reincorporation.
In a typical situation the corporation will have been in business
for some time and have accumulated at least a material amount of
earnings and profits. Assume that a new corporate entity is formed
and that the essential operating assets of the old corporation are
transferred to the new corporation for voting stock. The share-
holders then liquidate the old corporation and distribute the new
corporation's stock and any remaining cash and other liquid assets
to the stockholders of the old corporation (preincorporation-liquida-
tion).4
If the device is successful there will be a complete liquidation
'39 T.C. No. 5 (Oct. 8, 1962).
'39 T.C. No. 13 (Oct. 17, 1962). An appeal to the Ninth Circuit was
dismissed.
This term (earnings and profits) is not defined in the 1954 Code; how-
ever, § 312 describes the effect some transactions have on earnings and
profits. For purposes of this note, earnings and profits can be thought of as
the retained earnings or earned surplus of the corporation, without regard to
the fact that some transactions may be recorded differently for federal tax
purposes than for corporate book purposes. See generally STANLEY & KIL-
cULLEN, THE FEDERAL INcOME TAx § 301 at 119 (4th ed. 1961); WIXON,
ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK § 22 (4th ed. 1960).
'A similar problem is raised when the old corporation is liquidated, dis-
tributing its cash, liquid and operating assets to its shareholders, part or all
of whom then reincorporate the operating assets and continue the business
in corporate form (liquidation-reincorporation). See generally Kuhn, Liqui-
dation and Reincorporation Under the 1954 Code, 51 GEG. L.J. 96 (1962);
Rice, When is a Liquidation Not a Liquidation for Federal Income Tax Pur-
poses?, 8 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1956).
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